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NOTES
BINDING JURY VERDICT IN CHILD CUSTODY
PROCEEDINGS: ARTICLE 4639a AMENDED
The issue of child custody in Texas can now be determined by a
jury whose verdict is no longer advisory but is binding on the trial
judge. Articles 4639,' 4639a,' 4639b,s and 4639c' are the Texas pro-
visions concerning custody and support of the children of a divorce.
Article 463 9a' in its original 1935 version provided in part:
Upon the trial of any . . . [divorce], and in the event a divorce is
granted by the court, if there are . . .minor children, it shall be the
duty of such trial court to inquire into the surroundings and circum-
stances of each such child or children .... and such court shall make
such orders regarding the custody and support of each such child or
children, as is for the best interest of same....
House Bill 436 of the 57th Legislature, effective June 14, 1961,
amended article 4639a by adding to the above language the fol-
lowing:
provided, however, that the judgment of the court in a jury trial of a
divorce cause may not contravene the jury's determination of child
custody. In any hearing held in this State concerning the custody of
a child, whether pursuant to a divorce cause or not, any party to the
hearing may, upon assumption of jury costs, demand a jury to deter-
mine custody of the child, and the judgment of the court must con-
form to that determination.'
This amendment reverses the general principle that the trial judge,
sitting as a chancellor, determines the custody of a minor. Prior to
this time whenever a jury was used its verdict was merely advisory,
and the judge in his discretion could disregard it.! Under the new
amendment, not only is this power denied the judge, but a jury trial
is allowed in child custody cases as a matter of right.
Historically, the determination of the custody of minor children
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1960).
Ibid (providing that in a divorce action the court shall enter an order for the custody




Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1961).
"In determining the custody of a child, a court exercises a sound discretion, and its
determination will not be disturbed unless abuse of discretion is clearly shown." 1 Speer,
Marital Rights in Texas 169 (4th ed. 1961), citing In re Belcher, 155 Tex. 560, 289 S.W.2d
915 (1956); Clark v. Spradlin, 301 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957-Texarkana) no
writ hist., and others.
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was a well-recognized branch of equity.! The origin of that practice
may be traced to the delegation to the chancery by the English crown
of its duty to protect the helpless as parens patriae.' Generally, in all
equitable proceedings there has never been a right to a jury trial
unless that right has been expressly provided by constitution or
statute."o The chancellor has the authority to exercise a broad dis-
cretion, and this principle is followed in each American state ir-
respective of whether there is a merger of law and equity in that
jurisdiction." The general rule that has evolved is that
in child custody cases, the proceeding is an equitable one in which the
trial judge sits as a chancellor, and in which technical rules of practice,
procedure, and evidence are of little importance and may be disre-
garded. Jury findings are advisory only, and not binding on the trialjudge. Great latitude in the admission of evidence is permissible; the
children should be permitted to testify, and where the parties agree to
ex parte interviews and conferences between the court and the children,
they may not complain because the court gave weight to relevant in-
formation acquired therefrom."
Every American jurisdiction has some legislation relating to the
general issue of custody, and without exception the statutes make the
court's power over such proceedings a discretionary one." No state
other than Texas allows a jury trial as a matter of right.' Even
though the Texas Constitution takes a very liberal view of the right
to trial by jury," the extension of the right to all child custody
actions is unique.
'While the English courts of equity had from the start the exclusive power to appoint
guardians of minor children, the issue of custody pursuant to a divorce was within the
jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts until 1857 when Parliament created the Probate
and Divorce Division of the High Court of Justice. 17 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation
.275 (1939).§ Simkins, Equity 24 (2d ed. 1911); 19 Am. Jur. Equity § 179 (1939).
"Cushman v. Thayer Mfg. Jewelry Co., 76 N.Y. 365 (1879); Note, 7 Texas L. Rev.
663 (1929).
" "A court of chancery undoubtedly has, by reason of its nature and constitution,
ample power to decide every question of law or fact that comes before it .. " 19 Am.
Jut. Equity § 398, at 272 (1939). See also 27B C.J.S. Divorce 5§ 303, 310 (1959).
123 Speer, Marital Rights in Texas 211-12 '4th ed. 1961).
1""No doubt the court would have a general discretionary power in the matter, either
by virtue of its common-law or equity powers, or under the . . . statutes." 2 Vernier,
American Family Laws 192 (1936).
'
4 See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 303 (1959).
"Tex. Const. art. 1, § 15 provides that: "the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate. The Legislature shall pass such laws as may be needed to regulate the same, and
to maintain its purity and efficiency." Article V, § 8 provides that the district court
shall have original jurisdiction and general control over guardians and minors under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law. Section 10 of art. V confers the right of jury
trial in all causes in the district court.
The first case testing article 4639a as amended is Carter v. Carter, - S.W.2d
(Tex. Civ. App. 1962-Waco) writ pending. The majority upheld the constitutionality
of H.B. 436, but Associate Justice Jake Tirey, who wrote the court's opinion, disagreed.
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1962] NOTES
In the following comparatively unrelated proceedings, the issue
of child custody may now be determined in Texas by the verdict
of a jury:" (a) divorce, (b) habeas corpus, (c) declaring a child
"dependent or neglected," (d) guardianship, and possibly (e)
adoption.
a. Divorce Actions.-In a divorce action the determination of the
custody of children is in the nature of an ancillary proceeding," and
it has even been held"1 that such determination may be made when
a divorce has been denied. Although article 4632"9 provides that
either party to a divorce action may demand a jury trial, the cases
have held that to a certain extent the jury findings are not binding
on the trial judge."0 Moreover, the courts have unqualifiedly held
Basing his argument on art. V, § 8 of the Texas Constitution, Justice Tirey stated that
art. 4639a as amended is unconstitutional because ". . . the framers of our Constitution
did not intend that our Legislature would have the power to take the care, custody and
control of children away from a trained judiciary .. " The construction and interpre-
tation which has been uniformly given to § 8 is that it clothes the district court with the
old common law chancery jurisdiction of general control over guardians and minors.
Therefore, the clause in § 8 which gives the district court "original jurisdiction and
general control over . . . minors under such regulations as may be prescribed by law
can only be construed as enabling the legislature
to enact such laws relating to procedural matters so that the court would
have all necessary process, as will enable the court to effectively exercise
its general control and jurisdiction. Any other construction would be too
broad, and would authorize the Legislature to enact the amendment under
consideration, the effect of which is to be in open and irreconcilable conflict
with the general control of minors provided for by the section under con-
sideration ...
One cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court to deal with the personal
status or the person of a child and at the same time deny the power of the
court . . . to do with the child's person . . . whatever appears to the court
to be for the best interest of the child. . . . Yet the legislature by the
amendment, places the well-being and future status of the child solely in
the hands of the jury, and makes the district court impotent to do what it
believes to be for the best welfare of the child ....
16 Even though the amendment directly affects only a statute regarding custody in a
divorce proceeding, it clearly appears that the legislature did not intend to limit the rule
of a binding jury verdict to a divorce proceeding. The statute provides for a jury
"... in any hearing . . . pursuant to a divorce cause or not .. " Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 4639a (Supp. 1961). Before the amendment was enacted, the courts consistently
reached the same results, i.e., the verdict of a jury was merely advisory in child custody
hearings regardless of the type of proceeding. Kesler v. McGuire, 109 S.W.2d 1115 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937-Eastland) no writ hist.; Northcutt v. Northcutt, 287 S.W. 515 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1926-Eastland) error dism'd; see Note, 16 Texas L. Rev. 581 (1938).
173 Speer, op. cit. supra note 7, at 210, citing McClendon v. McClendon, 289 S.W.2d
640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956-Ft. Worth) no writ hist.
183 Speer, op. cit. supra note 7, at 210, citing Boggs v. Boggs, 306 S.W.2d 237 (Tex,
Civ. App. 1957-Amarillo) no writ hist.; see Annot., 113 A.L.R. 901 (1938); 151
A.L.R. 1380 (1944).
" Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1960).
10 "While findings of a jury in a divorce case are advisory only, it is the duty of the
court, where evidence warrants, to submit such issues to the jury and secure jury findings
on such facts and the failure to do so is reversible error." Zuniga v. Zuniga, 244 S.W.2d
270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-San Antonio) no writ hist., see generally Feild, Texas Divorce
(1940).
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that where the custody of the children was in issue, the jury's verdict
was advisory, and only a showing of a flagrant abuse of discretion
by the trial judge, whether he followed the advice of the jury or
not, would effect a reversal." In fact, the use of a jury had been
discouraged since the trial court was specifically given power to
determine which parent got custody under articles 463922 and
4639a."2 But in Wright v. Wright " the court relaxed this objection
because
the statute itself does not seem to expressly forbid the submission of the
issue as to the custody .. . to a jury, and the word "court" . . .
could ... be held to include a trial by jury .... We see no impropriety,
if the court desires the assistance of a jury in aiding him in the de-
termination of any matter of fact in issue, in submitting the same for
the finding of a jury. . . . [However], the verdict is not conclusive
upon the court.. *5 (Emphasis added.)
Later, in Lawler v. Lawler's it was made clear that even if a jury
was employed to assist the trial judge, the latter must also act as an
independent fact-finder. The court in Lawler noted that
the court recited in his judgment that he considered all the evidence
in connection with the answer returned by the jury to said issue, and
[the court] found as a fact that appellee was a fit and proper person
and that the interests and welfare of said children would be best sub-
served in her care, custody and control." (Emphasis added.)
b. Writs of Habeas Corpus.-In cases not involving divorce, the
use of a writ of habeas corpus has become the customary procedure
for determining the rights of contending parties claiming custody
of a child.2" Although this remedy is theoretically based on the im-
proper restraint of the child, the court upon obtaining jurisdiction
21 Winzer v. Winzer, 317 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958-Beaumont) no writ hist.;
Boggs v. Boggs, 306 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957-Amarillo) no writ hist.; Neal
v. Medcalf, 244 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-El Paso) no writ hist.; Northcutt v.
Northcutt, 287 S.W. 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926-Eastland) error disin'd; Kentz v. Kentz,
209 S.W. 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919-Amarillo) no writ hist.; see Note, 16 Texas L. Rev.
581 (1938).
22Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1960). This article states, in part, that
The court shall have power, in all divorce suits, to give the custody and
education of the children to either father or mother, as the court shall deem
right and proper . . . and . . . to issue any injunction or make any order
that the safety and well-being of any such children may require.
2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1960), as applied before H.B. 436.
24 110 S.W. 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) no writ hist.
25
1id. at 160.
2' 15 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929-Waco) no writ hist.
2 7 id. at 685.
"'Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex. 248, 28 S.W. 281 (1894); Tunnell v. Reeves, 35 S.W.2d
707 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); Long v. Smith, 162 S.W. 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914-
Amarillo) no writ hist.
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of the matter will go much further; it will determine all questions
which arise concerning the right to custody. 9 There had never been
a right to a jury trial in a habeas corpus proceeding because there
was no such right at common law at the time of adoption of the
constitution." Such a proceeding is not a "cause" within the mean-
ing of article V, section 10 of the Texas Constitution,3 and it was
felt that a demand for a jury would so delay the hearing that its
effectiveness would be greatly impaired.3 However, it was within
the authority of the court to impanel a jury and to require it to
make a finding which might be used in an advisory way.3
c. Proceedings to Declare a Child "Dependent or Neglected."-
Article 233 034 establishes a proceeding in which a child may be de-
clared (under specified circumstances) "dependent or neglected," but
regardless of the finding, the question of the child's future custody
will be determined. Article 2334" provides for a jury trial in such
a proceeding. The cases have construed the right to a jury strictly by
holding that a finding of a jury with respect to whether or not a
minor is a dependent or neglected child as defined in the act, if sup-
ported by the evidence, is binding on the court. However, the trial
court was not bound to award custody to persons whom the jury
determine are fit to have the care and custody of the children, and
some cases held that the court could even refuse to permit a jury
trial."
d. Guardianship Proceedings.-A guardian is a statutory officer
appointed by the probate court to protect the interests of a minor
and provide for the ward's education and maintenance." The Texas
Probate Code3 provides a procedure in the nature of a civil action
whereby a guardian can be appointed for a minor. The Probate Code
" Legate v. Legate, supra note 28; Tunnell v. Reeves, supra note 28.
3"Ex parte Ellerd, 71 Tex. Crim. Rep. 285, 158 S.W. 1145 (1913); Burckhalter v.
Conyer, 9 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928), noted in 7 Texas L. Rev. 663 (1929);
Joseph v. Puryear, 273 S.W. 974 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925-Austin) no writ hist.; Foster
v. Foster, 230 S.W. 1064 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921-Galveston) error dism'd; Pittman v.
Byers, 112 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) no writ hist.; Note, 16 Texas L. Rev. 581
(1938).
"'Tex. Const. art. V, 5 10 confers the right of jury trial in all causes in the district
courts. "Habeas corpus is a writ of right .. " Burckhalter v. Conyer, supra note 30.
" Burckhalter v. Conyer, 9 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
"aDuckworth v. Thompson, 37 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Comm. App. 1931); see Harris,
Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 7 Sw. L.J. 1 (1953).
"t Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1950).
3 Ibid.
36Booker v. Cameron County Child Welfare Unit, 320 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959-San Antonio) no writ hist.; Bee v. Robbins, 303 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. Civ. App 1957-
Dallas) no writ hist.
3'21 Tex. Jur. Guardian and Ward § 2 (1939).
"Tex. Prob. Code § 7 (1956).
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further provides that "the rights, powers and duties of ... guardians
shall be governed by the principles of the common law, when the
same do not conflict with the provisions of the statutes of this
State.""9 The Texas Constitution 40 gives the county court original
jurisdiction over probate proceedings, including appointment of
guardians, with appellate jurisdiction in the district court.4' But
since the constitution also gives the district court the exclusive power
to determine controversies over the custody of minors," the rule is
that the right to custody of a minor cannot be finally determined in
a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian in the county court."
Now, in the event an appeal of such appointment is taken to the
district court, or the proceeding for appointment arises originally in
the district court, the litigants should be entitled to a trial by jury
as granted by House Bill 436. 44
e. Adoption Proceedings.-Adoption proceedings are governed
rather strictly4' in Texas by articles 46a,4' 46b,4' and 46b-1. 4 1 The
29 Tex. Prob. Code § 32 (1956).
40 Tex. Const. art. V, § 16.
"' Tex. Const. art. V, § 8 provides that "the District Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction and general control in probate matters over the County Court . . . for
appointing guardians, . . . and original jurisdiction and general control over . . . guardians
and minors under such regulations as may be prescribed by law ......
Section 21 of the Texas Probate Code provides that:
There shall be no trial by jury in probate matters in the county court
except in proceedings involving persons of unsound mind and habitual
drunkards. In proceedings in the District Court, by appeal or otherwise,
the parties shall be entitled to trial by jury as in other civil actions in the
District Court.
4 Tex. Const. art. V, 5 8.
" In Thomason v. McGeorge, 285 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926) it was said that
the district court may interfere by wresting a minor from a guardian and may award its
custody elsewhere. In Whittenberg v. Craven, 258 S.W. 152 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924)
it was stated that no provision of the constitution provides for concurrent jurisdiction in
the district court and the county court over the custody and control of minors, and that
the statutes are void insofar as they attempt to confer upon the county court authority
to determine the custody and control of minors. In Anderson v. Cossey, 214 S.W. 624
(Tex. Civ. App. 1919-Ft. Worth) no writ bist., it was held that the right to the custody
of the minor is a question over which a court of equity has jurisdiction, and an order
and judgment of the county court awarding the care and custody to a designated person
does not preclude the district court from entertaining jurisdiction, where it is made to
appear that the best interests of the minor-the paramount consideration-demand that
custody should be changed. Finally, in Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187
(1949), the supreme court held that the powers of the district court to award custody
and to appoint and supervise guardians of the persons of minors are independent of and
superior to the powers of county courts.
44 Acts 1961, ch. 305.
""'While adoption statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of minors in order
to effectuate their beneficial purpose . . . the rule of strict construction applies in favor
of a non-consenting parent." Stinson v. Rasco, 316 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958-Dallas) no writ hist.
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1961).4 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1959).
"ibid.
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only method of adoption is that prescribed by the statutes"' since it
was unknown at common law," and there must be compliance with
all the conditions imposed by the legislature. Therefore, the right to
a jury trial in a contested adoption proceeding has been denied since
(a) adoption was unknown to the common law, and (b) the present
adoption statutes have no provisions for a jury trial." However, a dis-
tinction may be drawn between obtaining custody of a child and
adopting a child." In the latter instance, the rights, duties, and
obligations of the natural parents are finally assumed by the adopt-
ing parents;"' whereas, a custody decree is subject to alteration with
changing circumstances. Since the state has an interest in the well-
being of children within its jurisdiction, it may prescribe by statute
any reasonable test and standard which will best serve a child's
interests and welfare.' Whether the right to a jury trial which is
granted by House Bill 436" will be read into the adoption statutes
depends upon the somewhat unpredictable process of judicial inter-
pretation.
In considering the above items (except adoption), it should be
noted that in accordance with equity practices a prior custody decree
is subject to modification at any time upon proper showing." Just
as in the initial proceeding, any finding of a jury in the rehearing
was formerly advisory. However, now it appears that House Bill
436" will entitle litigants to a jury trial in a rehearing when that
right is granted in the initial proceeding.
The policy behind the consistent denial of a jury trial as a matter
of right in these actions seems to be based upon the responsibility
which the state has for the well-being of minor children. The courts,
"'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 46a (Supp. 1961), 46b, 46b-1 (1959).
" I Speer, Marital Rights in Texas 215 (4th ed. 1961); Hickman v. Smith, 238
S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-Austin) error ref.
"* Hickman v. Smith, 238 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951-Austin) error ref., in
which the court also stated, at 839, that "article 46a . . . validly and plainly makes it
the duty of the trial court or judge, as distinguished from a jury, to grant or deny a
petition for adoption as in his discretion the facts and welfare of the child require,"
and cited Oldfield v. Campbell, 191 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946-Waco) io writ hist.
"In Stinson v. Rasco, 316 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958-Dallas) no writ hist.
it was held that an adoption proceeding may not be used to determine the right to
custody. See also I Speer, op. cit. supra note 50, at 212.
5Sims v. Sims, 62 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933-Galveston) error dism'd.
"Brooks v. DeWitt, 143 Tex. 122, 182 S.W.2d 687 (1944).
5Acts 1961, ch. 305.
" There must be an allegation that the circumstances surrounding the child have
changed in such a manner that his best interests are no longer served. This amounts to
a new action; without a showing of changed circumstances the issue is res judicata. 1 Speer,
op. cit. supra note 50, at 212.
'"Oldfield v. Campbell, 191 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946-Waco) no writ hist.
5Acts 1961, ch. 305.
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rather than juries, perform the function historically assumed by the
chancellor. Since it is everywhere accepted that "the interest and
future of the child is paramount to all other considerations,"" it can
be argued that this interest lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the courts to protect. In this sense, a child custody case is not a
"cause" within the meaning of the constitution."0
There were three purposes" espoused by the legislature for the
enactment of the new amendment:" (1) The issue of who is best
suited to take custody of a child is a question of fact, hence clearly
within the realm of a jury. Since the law regards both parents as
equally entitled to custody of the child," the jury should be allowed
to determine from the facts which parent, or third person, can best
perform that function. (2) A jury is more "equitable." Since both
parents are equally entitled to custody, one may argue that each
should have the burden of proving that the other is less able to pro-
vide for the child's welfare. However, prior to the new amendment"4
the practice arose among trial judges of awarding a child to the
mother, unless she was shown to be unfit to assume such responsi-
bilities." (3) Statistics of the Texas Youth Council" show that of
those children adjudged delinquent who lived with one parent only,
nineteen per cent of the total lived with the mother; whereas, only
four per cent of the total lived with the father." Thus, the primary
intent of the legislature appears to be the elimination of the pre-
sumption favoring the mother.
House Bill 436 amending article 4639a" has provoked much con-
troversy among the bench and the bar. Many practicing attorneys,
" Northcutt v. Northcutt, 287 S.W. 515, 516 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926-Eastland)
error dism'd.
60Tex. Const. art. V, § 10 confers the right of jury trial in all causes in the district
courts. See Harris, op. cit. supra note 33, at 9-12.
61 The reasons given here were orally stated in an interview with Rep. Ben E. Lewis,
Dallas, who drafted and introduced the bill into the Texas House of Repre:entatives.
The original bill limited the binding verdict of the jury to the custody issue in divorce
proceedings. Representative Fairchild suggested from the House floor that the bill be
broadened to include "any custody proceeding, whether pursuant to a divorce or not,"
and in this revised form it passed the House by a vote of 146-1. The Senate voted 24-5
for the provision as amended. See Senate Journal of May 24, 1961, and House Journal of
May 18, 1961.
62 H.B. 436, Acts 1961, ch. 305.
63Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4639 (1960) provides: "The court shall have power,
in all divorce suits, to give custody . . . of the children to either father or mother, as
the court shall deem right and proper. .... "64 H.B. 436, Acts 1961, ch. 305.
65 Murphey v. Walker, 209 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948-Amarillo) no writ
hist.: Redwine v. Redwine, 198 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947-Amarillo) no writ hist.
06 Texas Youth Council Ann. Rep. to the Governor 43 (1961).
67 Since admittedly the great majority of children of divorced parents live with the
mother, these statistics do not appear too reliable.
6 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1961).
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along with most legislators, generally favor it, agreeing that the issue
of custody, being one of fact, is properly for a jury. "There is,
seemingly, security in the sometimes-prejudiced, sometimes-confused,
sometimes-inaccurate verdict of jurors. They have a way of reaching
a just result, even if they fail now and then to make a right de-
cision."" Critics of the new law include judges who object to the
vulnerability of juries to trial strategies and their tendency to be
subjective and emotional. Federal District Judge Sarah T. Hughes
stated:
This requirement that the judgment cannot contravene the jury's de-
termination of child custody . . . is a backward step in the handling of
children, a judge being better qualified through experience gained from
many hearings to determine such matters in the best interest of the
child."0
The members of the Family Law Section of the State Bar of Texas
have unanimously approved a proposed new act to amend article
4639a7" by eliminating the provisions making the judgment conform
to a jury's verdict and by eliminating the provision permitting de-
mand for a jury trial in child custody cases. At this writing the pro-
posed act is under consideration by the Board of Directors of the State
Bar of Texas as to possible endorsement to the next legislature.
It appears that the 57th Legislature intended to establish a basic
policy in the handling of child custody cases. Nullifying a long line
of unqualified decisions, the legislature revoked the trial judge's
traditional discretionary power along with his presumption favoring
the mother as the parent best qualified to protect a child's interests.
Before a jury the contending sides will now get equal consideration.
However, it is purely conjectural that juries will not harbor similar
prejudices in favor of the mother. It is submitted that even if the
new amendment is held constitutional, it is nevertheless undesirable
to allow mandatory and binding jury verdicts in child custody cases
merely on the speculation that fathers will obtain more impartial
treatment at the hands of a jury.
Shirley R. Levin
09 Harris, supra note 33, at 19.
70 Hughes, Problems Concerning Children Arising From Conflict in Marriage, 24 Tex.
B.J. 925, 1001 (1961).
71 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1961).
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